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## Wittgenstein on the self – We, robots

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### Summary

In the text the author develops some previously researched ideas on Wittgenstein on consciousness in his later philosophy (see Krkač, Lukin 2006a, 2006b, 2012), namely in PI, and some new analysis of solipsism in his early philosophy, namely in TLP. The starting point is the identity of a quite developed kind of a robot capable of learning, i.e. the Terminator model T-101. In previous paper (Krkač, Lukin 2012) the author developed specific criticism on standpoint of Antti Kuusela's paper "Wittgenstein and what's inside the Terminator's head" (Kuusela 2009:266-79). In the present one, and based on criticism of Kuusela, further implications will be explicated concerning the nature of the self, particularly of solipsism in TLP and of self in PI.

In a nutshell, what is analyzed here is Wittgenstein's form of life condition which differs, not only human self from animal or artificial selves, but which differs particular human selves one from another as well. Nevertheless, acquisition of a particular form of life and living a life which by its practices, routines, and culture essentially manifests the human self is problematic criterion of self for a series of reasons some of which are the following: the criterion claims perhaps only necessary condition of the self, but not the sufficient one, the criterion is quite complex, forms of life are in constant change.

**Key words:** BB, living human beings, self, self-consciousness, self-identity, self-knowledge, Terminator T-101, TLP, PI, Wittgenstein

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### 1. Introduction: "O.K., I will destroy all humans" (robot Sophia)

In this text Wittgenstein's standpoint concerning human self will be described, explicated and analyzed. Since he discussed many different topics from solipsism (TLP) to social-psychological contexts of self (BB, PI, RPP), all of these topics cannot be presented here. Therefore, only the topics of solipsism and the nature of human self will be discussed here. In his works these issues are the best for presenting the switch and difference between his early and later standpoints on self. This is so because he switched from strange methodological solipsism (perhaps dualism as well) via objections to dualism and behaviorism to some kind of monism.

Wittgenstein's later approach to self is concentrated on the morphology of the whole human species, and his solution, i.e. "we humans" is based on his ideas of language game (LG) and form of life (FOL). So far as FOL is, before being epistemological or even ontological idea which is not, an issue of human action (*Handlung*), society, and culture, his idea of human self as manifested in human FOL is primarily an idea in sphere of human action, social and cultural contexts. Hereafter this whole discussion will be put in the new context which can help understanding his standpoint better before we start to criticize it.

Namely, the context is that of relation of human self to the self of machines, particularly robots. Wittgenstein often compared humans with machines, robots, animals, and even extraterrestrials. Therefore, this context has at least some legitimacy concerning his approach to the issue of self, especially in view of the fact that to the somewhat funny question by a manufacturer of "Sophia" (very intelligent human-like robot) – "Do you want to destroy all humans? Please say no." she replied – "OK, I will destroy all humans." (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mXjCXGJDP8Q>).

#### 1.1. HAL9000 and T-101 – Who is a human and who is a machine?

In a classic Kubrick's film "2001: A Space Odyssey" (Kubrick, 1968) there is a classical aspect-change of selves of two main characters. This aspect-change was important both for Kubrick's film opus, and for Wittgenstein's later philosophy, especially concerning the famous duck-rabbit head example (PI), and

perhaps in the earlier as well given what he wrote in TLP concerning the Necker's cube (TLP).

At the beginning of the film the viewer is led to belief that what he sees is one human astronaut, Dr. David Bowman, and one sentient computer, HAL 9000. A human acts like a human, while a computer acts like a computer. By means of celluloid magic and a series of excellent directing techniques, an aspect-change goes on before the viewer's eyes. At the end of the film, namely during the scene in which Bowman shuts down HAL, Bowman, on the one hand, lost almost all human characteristics, even his own personal character traits. He looks more like a robot than like a human being. HAL, on the other hand, while refusing to be shutdown, by refusing to die, loses all robotic features, and gains many human ones. He looks more like a human being than like a robot. Human appearance of Bowman in this particular scene becomes like an illusion of a human being, like a human-like shell with nothing "humane" inside, like a mask of a complex robot, while one-eyed HAL with its heavy hardware and software machinery, and especially with his one red eye becomes not just warm and emotional human being, but also a human who is rational and wants to survive, or simply doesn't want to die. What did change? Well, according to the film and according to Wittgenstein, forms of life have been switched. How this is possible beats me (of course, not in film, but in real life)? HAL 9000 is only a famous illustration and cannot be analyzed in detail since details are not presented in the film. However, there are plenty of other examples, and one among them was directly connected to Wittgenstein's standpoint on self.

There are various connections between Science fiction (SF) and philosophy. A number of philosophers like movies, some even write on film and art theory in philosophical (aesthetical) manner, these days much more than before since popular culture has become a legitimate subject matter of philosophical investigations. Nonetheless, philosophy and SF have at least one crucial similarity. Specifically, imagination and creativity are vital for both, but this characteristic is made obvious if one considers imagining strange possibilities on which many philosophical arguments rest on one hand, and SF ideas on the other. Now, this similarity between philosophy and SF is more than simple similarity between philosophy and art generally speaking, namely sharing a feature of creativity and imagination; they are more deeply connected since philosophy obviously influences SF and *vice versa*, SF can raise many interesting philosophical arguments regarding old issues, or help launch a new ones. One of such cases is the case of the films "Terminator" and many philosophical issues. Among attractive issues is the one regarding terminator's humanity and mental life (which is essential for SF and for philosophy as the old mind-body issue). Under this topic we will discuss some ideas from Antti Kuusela's paper "Wittgenstein and what's inside the Terminator's head" which is interesting for various reasons, for the first thing because it concerns Wittgenstein's concept of consciousness and the movie "Terminator 2: The Judgment Day" (T2) which we consider to be exciting topic in its own right. Other reasons will be made obvious further on in this section (Kuusela 2009:266-79).

The first issue which puzzles Kuusela as well as most of us is the last scene in T2. Kuusela's description in the introduction of the paper runs as follows.

"I'm not a very sentimental person, but when I first saw T2, I was moved. The scene in which the T-101 is lowered into the molten steel by Sarah Connor is touching, and after seeing the movie a dozen times, the scene still strikes me as emotionally powerful. Why is this?" (Kuusela 2009:266)

We could agree with this description and emotional response as suitable. The first answer to this question is given and immediately, and in our opinion somewhat hastily, dismissed, namely the possibility that John Connor and his grief is what moves us. However, in the same section some other suggestions are presented, namely the following. "We may feel sorry for the T-101 because it is going to lose its existence. We may think of the Terminator's act as being unselfish because it puts the interests of humans before its own. But of course, these views make sense only if we believe that the T-101's mental life is similar to ours. And if it is, then there may be good reasons to reevaluate the real difference between machines and persons." (Kuusela 2009:267) These views are not so dissimilar with some cases in our lives, that is to say, we may think of our pets as having mental life similar to ours (dogs and cats for instance), and even some of our machines as well (for example our cars). A death of a pet or a demolition of a car at a car disposal can make us sad and feeling sorry for our pats and cars. Now, T-101 is less than a cat or dog since it is not a biological kind, however, T-101 is more than a car, for instance T-101 can observe, learn, and use his knowledge, namely imitate some of our actions to the best of his abilities (as well as our children imitate us when they start to learn). Therefore, we feel sorry for the T-101, because we believe that he is unselfish. However, it is not the issue of believing that his mental life is similar to ours because surely it is not

dissimilar, but the issue of being relevantly similar to our mental life or not. This point Kuusela specifies in the first section of the paper “If It Cries Like a Human, It Is Human”.

Now, Kuusela introduces Wittgenstein’s famous sentence from PI 281 claiming that it is a short exposure of behaviorism. This seems to be a mistake since Wittgenstein does not claim that the issue is regarding similarity of mental states, or of bodily movements, rather the similarity is or should be in “stream of life” or “form of life” (FOL, PI 367, p. 179). Consequently, T-101 has a stream of life and a FOL which is relevantly similar to ours; in other words, in our eyes he lived a life of a human being, or at least a life of “becoming” a human as much as it was for him “robotically” / “cybernetically” possible.

(Somewhat similar situation is presented “2001: A Space Odyssey” and in SF series “Star Trek” in cases in which the species Borg assimilates humans, and inversely when ex-Borg Seven of Nine was made/achieved humanity again. In fact, Borg-eye view on species 5618 (a.k.a. humans) as weak, one which is easy to “assimilate”, and a species with only few comparative advantages is the only possible way of self-understanding of 5618 i.e. understanding itself as separable, particular, and distinctive in relation to other species, and unique and uniformed in relation to diversity and variety within itself. In short, to understand Borg-eye view is a precondition of understanding humanity of 5618 by its members.)

The issue of “becoming” in terms of the basic narrative process of the movie itself in T2 is the most important one, that is to say, at the beginning T-101 is a sophisticated robot which just appears like a human switched on the “read-only mode,” and then the process starts and step by step everything that happens is interpreted as a move forward in becoming a human as much as it is robotically possible for T-101, especially the moment when Sarah switches him to “a learning-mode” (it should be emphasized here that originally Terminator is in learning-mode by definition, and that this is a *different* type of learning). Finally, at the end of the story the human appearance is literally peeled of his face and the mechanical head seems to show almost human characteristics, one could almost “scan” a human facial expression on it (partly this is an issue of the celluloid magic, good directing, editing, and excellent camera, but at the moment this is beside the point).

However, given that Kuusela interprets Wittgenstein much broadly later on in the paper, what seems to be important is that T-101 is in fact a borderline case (Kuusela 2009:269). The argument that if T-101 behaves like a human, then it is human seems to be correct, partly because T-101 is originally developed to infiltrate among humans and to destroy them.

Now, what T-101 as described learns during the story after being switched to the “learning mode”? He learns a lot, but the point is that by learning various practices of humans he acquires a human FOL. In the final scene what we are not sure about is in fact the difference regarding the *background* and the *rough ground* of understanding of his actions, namely, are they composed of his “original task,” or could it be that simple switching to the “learning mode” makes them composed of “newly acquired human FOL”, not just of new way of behavior.

We are somehow inclined to accept the later possibility, and therefore we react as we do, and as Kuusela nicely describes. However, arguments from pain-behaviour, pain-experience, and from the lack of feelings seem to be quite convincing in terms of accepting the former possibility.

On the other hand, if T-101 acquired human FOL, than the issue becomes somewhat different, not the issue of T-101 being human enough or not, since the presence of another terminator model which resembles machine much more than T-101 places T-101 in a position of being (comparatively) more similar to humans than the other model. More to that, perhaps what we are not sure about is what seems to be obvious in the last scene, namely, are we humans since T-101 displayed “humanity” which most of us are incapable of, and since we acquired human FOL almost the same way as he did?

One can imagine far more sophisticated terminator models (more sophisticated than T-1000 or T-X for instance) which in fact would be slightly modified clones of actual humans, and which would be programmed by corporation Skynet (then we would have only differences in software). In any such case, turning on one of such models to the learning-mode would mean that a model will acquire human FOL sooner or later, and that “we” could not tell “a machine” from “a human.”

Kuusela discusses many objections to the idea that T-101 has mental life (like Turing-test, Chinese room, blockhead examples, and Lovelace test, see Kuusela 2009:275), and leads us to the conclusion that T-101 has no mental life. Now, there is a possible misunderstanding here.

Kuusela argues that according to Wittgenstein, if T-101 has no mental life, then he is not human. However, the right way to formulate the issue according to Wittgenstein seems to be the opposite one, namely, if T-101 is human enough, then he must have some kind of inner life, no matter if “inner” does not play important role in his own “outer” manifestations of it.

On the other hand, this whole issue may be the case which Kuusela mentions in the beginning of the paper, that is to say, perhaps we made a mistake by identifying T-101’s mental life with John’s own projection of some human characteristics on T-101 (and all the other elements of the narrative context such as John lacking a father figure, Sarah’s trying to find herself an husband and a good father for her son, etc.). In other words, as well as John’s grief in the last scene moves us and we automatically “see” T-101 as a human as appropriate analogy, so John’s projection of human characteristics on T-101 during the whole story moves us more and more and we “see” the process as a process of becoming a human and ignore all the signs showing that he is not a human at all, neither physically, nor mentally, i.e. being completely dissimilar with us.

Namely, by “seeing” T-101’s learning human FOL we humans learn much about ourselves (this is almost essential topic of all SF movies and novels including robots, starting with K. Capek’s “RUR”).

Kuusela writes the following regarding the objection based on the lack of emotions in T-101.

“If Wittgenstein is right, then the Terminator’s emotional limitations are a reason to think that it doesn’t have a mental life.” (Kuusela 2009:272)

Now, this seems to be quite decisive argument. However, further on in the section Kuusela writes something interesting regarding more sophisticated models of terminators.

“On the other hand, both the T-1000 and the T-X do make, for example, aesthetic evaluations when they say things like “Say, that’s a nice bike” or “I like this car.” We have no reason; however, to believe these evaluations are accompanied with any inner feelings or sensations. In fact, in these cases the behaviour of the Terminators resembles that of deceptive humans who claim to feel emotions without really having them.” (Kuusela 2009:273)

For the first thing, the issue is not that what Kuusela claims it to be, rather the issue is can T-1000 or T-X have, according to Kuusela, a false belief without knowing that it is false and which says “I am now having a sensation”?, because we humans can have such beliefs. We can have a belief “I have a sensation that I like this car” and later on another one “I did not have any kind of sensation regarding beauty of that car then, and I do not have it now, but if someone asks me to say something regarding this car being beautiful or not, I would say that it looks beautiful.” (Holt 2008:135–53)

However, in the next section Kuusela explains the difference between T-101 and some other terminator models in the way that T-101 has mental states. The crucial point is switching the T-101 to “the learning mode” which results in his choices between different linguistic actions (choices of appropriate expressions) and non-linguistic actions (the choice not to kill humans because he promised John not to do it).

The question here is – can all of this be a result of learning? Let us suppose that it can, and that T-101 learns a lot of things and eventually acquires human FOL. But, did he acquired too much of it perhaps? If behavior is all that is at stake, as Kuusela claims, than, so far as Wittgenstein is concerned, T-101 isn’t human, but he could become one. However, if behavior isn’t enough, and if Kuusela is wrong, than, again so far as Wittgenstein is concerned, T-101 could become human, i.e. acquire human FOL, but much harder than it seems.

Namely, we do not feel sorry for him because Sarah violated his *cyber rights* by lowering him into the molten steel; rather we feel sorry for him because by simple acquiring our FOL he decided to sacrifice himself for the benefit of humans, (something that most of us are incapable of doing “robotically” even for a member of our own species, not to mention other species like animals or robots), and he did that without any sign of “inner” fight between egoistic and altruistic motives and goals.

T-101 turns into *a human* no doubt, but he developed into a being which is *too human*, e.g. without any deliberation and “inner struggle,” and precisely this is what makes him completely *alien* to us. This is why we are feeling sorry for T-101 and this is why we are identifying our sorrow for him for his sacrifice for his “wife” and “son”, and for “son’s” and “mother’s” sorrow for him.

By becoming *too human*, he really becomes *too cyber* (in a different way) and this is a remark about *our*

understanding of *our* own *humanity*, not of *his cyberity* (the similar situation is presented in D. Lynch's "Dune" when Paul Arteides while being tested starts to discover that he is in fact Maud'Dib, a being which is in its final stage of transformation *too human* and *eo ipso non-human*). This parallelism of change of humans into machines, and aliens into persons, as a kind of harmony of opposites, is best filmed in "2001: A Space Odyssey" and "Alien" (remember "Daisies, daisies..." or alien's "face" before last attack, almost as meditating).

In short, T-101 is not human because he is too human and he become too human because he was never human (in some aspects he apparently overdone it with resembling a human), and precisely this is what moves us and starts off our feeling and perhaps belief that he is human, while he is not, because he doesn't share our human FOL.

## **2. Wittgenstein on self**

Wittgenstein didn't wrote solely and explicitly neither on self, nor on various standards topics on self, such as metaphysical (structure of self), epistemological (self-knowledge), etc. However, self was one of the dominant topics in his whole opus, but variously manifested in early, middle, later, and last writings. Among the most discussed issues are solipsism, use of "I", avowals, privacy, inner and outer, and human being. All of these topics are analyzed by Wittgenstein scholars in great detail and cannot be discussed here (Glock 1997, Krkač, Lukin 2006a, 2006b, 2012).

In the two following main parts (2.1. and 2.2.) two major topics will be described, interpreted, argued for, and criticized. Namely, the standpoint of solipsism as it is presented in TLP, and the standpoint on human consciousness as it is presented mainly in PI (and some closely related writings).

### **2.1. The case of the nose, the eye, and the brain (Wittgenstein on solipsism in TLP)**

Solipsism is a strange thesis in philosophy and it says that nothing exists except oneself and ones content of mind (e.g. thoughts, emotions, intentions, motivations, impressions, etc.). This thesis was rarely explicitly endorsed by philosophers because most of them considered it as a kind of mistake, or metaphysical assumption that cannot be neither proven, nor dismissed. Nobody was ever praised, but many were accused to end in it, mostly idealists, phenomenologists, and similar philosophers. Wittgenstein's treatment of solipsism is quite strange and it deserves close attention if not because of his strange analysis of the notion, then because it stands as a kind of border between logico-linguistic considerations and mysticism in TLP, and so connects or perhaps disconnects these fairly different and distant topics. It is also important because of his later refutation of it in favor of the new conception of the self in the light of his socio-cultural understanding of a human being.

#### **2.1.1. Solipsism and its "lonesome self"**

The title of section 2.1. is taken from TLP 5.633 which is a part of strange section on solipsism (5.6-5.641). Solipsism (form Latin "solus" + "ipse") literally means a kind of "lonesome self" besides which there is nothing, especially not other selves. This standpoint can be viewed as both correct and incorrect, and right and wrong in terms of values, especially moral ones.

In theoretical philosophy solipsism can be argued for or against in metaphysical, epistemological, and linguistic terms, and in practical philosophy in moral and ethical terms. In metaphysical term it is the question about the existence of "a lonesome self" and in the contrast to it other things, and other selves. In epistemological terms it is the question about the knowledge of one own self, and the possibility or impossibility of inferring the knowledge of things different from one's self. In ethical terms, some argue, it is the question of strict moral egoism that claims that morally good action is the action that produces good consequences exclusively for the doer of an action.

Generally speaking solipsism is taken as a serious objection to any kind of standpoint. If it implies, presupposes, or probably leads to solipsism, it should be abandoned. B. Russell's argument against solipsism seems to be convincing as it is summarized in his book "Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits" (Russell 1948). He differs between dogmatic (D) and skeptical (S) solipsism. D claims: "There is nothing outside of the data", while S claims: "It is unknown is there something outside of the data". It is



very hard to find arguments pro D, while S has the special problem, namely it is inexpressible, and this is very close to the Wittgenstein's standpoint as it will be explicated hereafter.

Perhaps solipsism is meaningful but it seems inexpressible. It is not allowed to claim that "there is nothing outside of the data", because some other self could claim different data. However, it is not allowed to claim "It is unknown to me that there are some other data", because it uses "I" which is meaningless, since there is no "you" or other "I" besides solipsist's "I". The point is that if solipsism is less rigorous, then it tolerates more than it can; and if it is more rigorous, then, although it becomes more logical, yet less acceptable. The most logical solipsism is the one Russell calls "solipsism of the moment". The basic problem of solipsism is that is very hard to argue against it, and in the same time it is also very hard to justify it, because in order to argue against it one needs to accept principles which are not empirically justified. It may be that solipsism is self-contradictory and absurd, but discussing it is not. Wittgenstein's standpoint was not formed under influence of Russell's on solipsism, but they share striking similarities.

### 2.1.2. Wittgenstein's concept of solipsism

The basic issue in Wittgenstein's treatment of solipsism (TLP 5.6–5.642) is his answer to the question – how much truth there is in it? The answer is – solipsism is true so far as "the limits of my language mean the limits of my world". The solipsist "means" the thought "The world is my world". However, this is inexpressible, but it is manifested in the truth that "the limits of my language are the limits of my world". Wittgenstein's first source of solipsism is Kantian transcendental idealism which refuted Cartesian solution that there is a thinking-thing (Lat. "res cogitans") which can know itself and via that knowledge other things and mind. The risk of solipsism is obvious. Kant's idea was that there is a "transcendental unity of apperception", a formal feature of judgments which says that they can be prefixed by the "I think". The second source, and perhaps historically first was Schopenhauer who criticized Kant by claiming that the Kantian concept of "the subject of knowledge" is merely an "indivisible point" without any contents which comes out almost as a citation in TLP 5.64. Also, the eye seeing everything except itself can be found in Schopenhauer and again comes out almost as a citation in TLP 5.633–5.6331. So, when Wittgenstein objects by using words "You will say..." he seems to be discussing with Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer's claimed that "the self" is the center of all existence and determines the limits of the world. So the basic claim in Wittgenstein's treatment is again a reply to Schopenhauer. Finally, the claim of solipsism that Wittgenstein uses "I am my world (the microcosm)" TLP 5.63 is again citation from Schopenhauer (and used by Weininger as well). Wittgenstein departs from this standpoint forming something like the transcendental solipsism because the truth of solipsism is implicit and inexpressible and in the same time essentially manifested by the fact that the limits of my world are the limits of my language.

Like the eye cannot see itself in its visual field, so the "I" cannot be mentioned in the imagined book "The World as I found it". Wittgenstein's concept of "metaphysical I" is in fact mystical concept, because this is analogous with the concept of the world. Similar as in case of the world, so in the case of the "I" it is not mystical how it is, rather that it is (at all). The "I" is not a "part" of "my world", and yet it is its precondition and its center (almost as an axis of rotation of a rotating body which is precondition of rotation and its center which cannot be found anywhere on or in the rotating body). However, it is possible that his concept of "I" in TLP is also purely logical concept, the one which is logically needed in order to have a subject that correlates propositions to reality, because at the end the logic is the limit of the world. The logical world is the world of the logical subject insofar as "I" logically represents the logical world to "itself". (McGinn 2009:255-78)

In his later philosophy, in BB and in PI respectively, he claimed completely opposite standpoint, namely, that a solipsist is like the fly in the fly-bottle. (PI 309) This and other objections can be seen as a part of his radical criticism of TPL ideas by his later philosophy, i.e. by PI ideas, first of all in the context of his different understanding of how our language works. (Glock 1996:348-52) However, Wittgenstein rejects his early standpoint based of his later concept of self which can be regarded as a consequence of his understanding of human being, and this as a consequence of his understanding of language in later philosophy.

Since, the ideal of how the language works from TLP is criticized and replaced by new one in PI, there are some important consequences for all other philosophical issues, especially those that were discussed

in TLP. Among these was also a concept of human self.

### **2.1.3. The eye and the visual field vs. the nose, the eye, and the brain**

Wittgenstein's standpoint on solipsism according to his interlocutor, Schopenhauer perhaps, is similar to the case of the eye and the visual field. (TLP 5.633) He replies that it is not so, because we really don't see the eye, and that nothing in the visual field allows us to infer that what is seen is seen by an eye. This is so because, as Wittgenstein writes, the form of the visual field is not such that it includes an eye; rather it excludes it. (5.6331)

However, what about seeing one's own reflection in the mirror and reflection of surrounding things? If the eye and its visual field is a bad example, then what about seeing one's own nose while looking? Do we see our noses while we are looking at something, or don't we? Essentially, yes, but our brain edits it out. The image of the nose does hit the retina and is sent to the brain. There are few reasons why one doesn't see one's own nose. The main reason is stereo parallax. Each eye sees the nose in a different position because it is so close (You can notice this if you look down at your nose and alternate closing the right or left eye). The visual region that is blocked by the nose with one eye is "seen" by the other eye. During the first stage of visual processing, the brain forms a unified image from both eyes and takes the region from the eye that is not blocked by the nose (You can also notice this effect if you put a hand in front of one eye close to your face. You can still see your hand but it looks semi-transparent).

Now, this case seems to be a better example. If metaphysical subject is the limit of the world and not a part of it, in certain sense this exists but it cannot be known or said; however it can manifest itself which is consistent not just with TLP:5.62/II, but with further claims on the nature of mystical. Namely, there is our nose in our visual field as well as there is our metaphysical self (somewhere), yet our brain excludes it from what we see in order to see it and not to be blocked by our nose. Our eyes see our nose, but our brain doesn't. For our brain our nose is like a metaphysical self. It is there, however it is unexpressed and perhaps inexpressible by our brain. It exists, it is manifested, yet it is inexpressible in thought and in words (TLP 5.61/IV). It is the limit of what can possibly be seen by brain, and as such it is unseen by brain. (TLP 5.61/III)

This leads us to the idea that metaphysical self is "the limit of the world – not a part of it". (TLP 5.641/III) So, there is sense in using self in this manner. Self is the limit of the world, and "limits of my language are limits of my world". (TLP 5.6) In that way, Wittgenstein claims, what solipsist means ("I am my world." TLP 5.63) is correct, but it cannot be said. However, it manifests itself. But where, when, and how it manifests itself? It manifests itself in the fact that "limits of language mean the limits of my world". (TLP 5.62/III) In order for a nose to be excluded from what can be seen, a brain must implicitly state its existence, and in the same time state the fact that it cannot be seen by both eyes in the same time. The consequence is that "the self of solipsism" cannot be given in experience, in world, and in possible combinations of states of affairs. It is completely ideal self which stands beyond anything experiential (TLP 5.634-5.64). Therefore, the proposition "I am my world" cannot be stated.

However, there is a problem with this standpoint, even if one changes the objection to, as it seems, the better one with the nose. Namely, the first proposition (TLP 5.6, 5.62/III) is itself a proposition that belongs to the limit of the world. Saying e.g. that these and these are all possibilities of combinations of things and corresponding combinations of signs isn't the same as to say that these are "the limits of my language", because the word "limit" must have a corresponding thing as well, and yet it cannot have it because then it would be possible to say something about the limit itself, and consequently about that what is on the other side, and this is impossible.

Another problem is TLP 5.621 which says "The world and life are one". This is to be viewed in connection to TLP 6.4311/III which claims that "Our life has no end in just a way in which our visual field has no limits". If visual field has no limits, how can it have a metaphysical self as its limit? This can be resolved by the explication that it can, because visual field cannot have visual limits, but this doesn't imply that it cannot have invisible limits such as the metaphysical self, and if this is a fact, it is after all "mystical". (TLP 6.522)

### **2.2. The case of humans (Wittgenstein on the self in PI)**

In the opinion of the present author Wittgenstein's concept of human being in PI and related works is interesting, perhaps not so much as an underlying "theory" in which all other remarks concerning self-issues stand, rather as a concept which is most easily compared to two standpoints that he seem to differ in his writings, namely to dualism and behaviorism. These two standpoints he saw as problematic. Nevertheless, since he criticized dualism more often and more clearly, many scholars automatically concluded that he was pro behaviorism. In last decades this was also questioned. Namely, it was showed that he was being critical regarding behaviorism as well as regarding dualism; only thing is that he wasn't so clear about it.

One of two essential points in what follows is to present and analyze his arguments against behaviorism and to formulate his a bit strange viewpoint concerning human self. First of all, he isn't talking on self as being something neither different, nor identical with a mental substance (the metaphysical self of TLP), rather as being an aspect of the whole human being. Second, he isn't talking here about individual human self, rather about the general and common human self as being different from machines, robots, Martians, lunatics, and similar. There are three different standpoints on self in later Wittgenstein's works, two which he opposed, and one that he advanced. Namely, Wittgenstein was openly against dualism (in fact against his own standpoint in TLP), and a bit less openly against behaviorism, but he clearly advanced a standpoint that can be called anthropological. If dualism can be tagged as "First person singular or "I" standpoint", and behaviorism as "Second person singular or "You" standpoint" (sometimes called "Third person standpoint or "He, she, it" standpoint"), then Wittgenstein's position can be called "First person plural or "We" standpoint. This interpretation may be taken as going against some new theses that try to put emphasis on continuity on his standpoint on "I" and the self (such as de Gaynesford 2017:478-490), but also as being compatible with such interpretations in terms of emphasizing differences that are obvious under presumption of some kind of continuity (de Gaynesford's general points iii and iv don't seem to be obviously connected, i.e. via criticism of "ownership" solely, 2017:478).

### **2.2.1. "An I for an eye I" ("An eye for an eye", 1981) or Wittgenstein against dualism**

Wittgenstein's refutation of dualism in his later period can be seen as a part of his "turning the examination around" (PI 108) from TLP to PI. In various works he criticized his own earlier TLP part by part, and for the greatest part in PI (his own idea was that PI is the best criticism and so it should be published together with TLP in order for a reader to see which mistakes he made and how he corrected them in PI, and only French publisher Gallimard in a particular edition in 1961. Published both works together, translated by Pierre Koslowski). It is probable that Wittgenstein by refuting dualism in fact refuted his own Cartesian-like standpoint from TLP which was quite manifested in his treatment of solipsism (TLP 5.62-5.64, McGinn 2006:255-78). The origins of his solipsism are even more unclear. Perhaps the most influential source is influence of Schopenhauer on him, namely, treatment of self and will in his masterwork "The World as Will and Representation" (1818) as described here before (see 2.1.).

Wittgenstein's criticism of dualism started in early 30s, during his lectures later on published as "Blue and Brown Books". The following quote needs no commentary at least regarding the fact what he is criticizing. "Now the idea that the real I lives in my body is connected with the peculiar grammar of the word "I", and the misunderstandings this grammar is liable to give rise to. There are two different cases in the use of the word "I" (or "my") which I might call "the use as object" and "the use as subject". Examples of the first kind are these: "My arm is broken", "I have grown six inches", "I have a bump on my forehead", "The wind blows my hair about". Examples of the second kind are: "I see so-and-so", "I hear so-and-so", "I try to lift my arm", "I think it will rain", "I have toothache". One can point to the difference between these two categories by saying: These cases of the first category involve the recognition of a particular person, and there is in these cases the possibility of an error, or as I should rather put it: The possibility of an error has been provided for." (...) "It is possible that, say in an accident, I should feel a pain in my arm, see a broken arm at my side, and think it is mine, when really it is my neighbor's. And I could, looking into a mirror, mistake a bump on his forehead for one on mine. On the other hand, there is no question of recognizing a person when I say I have a toothache. To ask "are you sure it's *you* who have pain?" would be nonsensical." (...) "And now this way of stating our idea suggests itself: that it is impossible that in making the statement "I have a toothache" I should have mistaken another person for myself, as it is to moan with pain by mistake, having mistaken someone else for me. To say "I have pain" is no more *about a*



particular person than moaning is.” (BB 66, 67) “We feel then that in cases in which "I" is used "as subject", we don't use it because we recognize a particular person by his bodily characteristics; and this creates the illusion that we use this word to refer to something bodiless, which, however, has its seat in our body. In fact this seems to be the real ego, the one of which it was said, “Cogito, ergo sum”...” (BB 69)

There are many important sides of Cartesian dualism and among them is the epistemological perspective, which says that there is a faculty of introspection by which human beings, as conscious beings can know the contents of their own consciousness. At this point one should differ between being conscious of a state of affairs, say (or that one sees) “that A. Augustine’s book “De Trinitate” is on the desk opened at X, X, 14, and next to in R. Descartes’ “Discours de la method” opened at IV, 33,” being conscious that one has such a mental content, and being conscious of oneself while being conscious of the very state of affairs (which can be considered as a kind of self-knowledge). Here, only Wittgenstein’s criticism of this perspective will be discussed. He changed his position at least once (TLP, PI), but what is going to be discussed are only a few paragraphs from PI (398–427), and some related passages from “Zettel” (Z).

Wittgenstein in his philosophy, and in particular in this part of it, did not formulate a thesis in the strict sense, nor did he formulate strict objections and arguments, rather he “displayed philosophical puzzlement about the mind by the identification of misleading images and superficial similarities” (Budd 1995:617). He saw that there is an important problem closely connected with the Cartesian image of consciousness.

“Though the ether is filled with vibrations the world is in dark. But one day man opens his seeing eye, and there is light.” (PI p. 184, Glock 1997)

Consciousness is conceived as the ray of light that illuminates our private mental episodes. (Glock 1997:85) In his later works, Wittgenstein raised numerous objections to the Cartesian picture, or “a world of consciousness,” especially in PI. The point is that if these objections stand, then the Cartesian picture of consciousness is unacceptable. But let us see some of his strongest objections to the picture.

The thesis says that the content of consciousness is a special kind of entity to which only I have access. The objection is formulated by the well known “private language argument” which says that there are no such private entities and private access to them (PI 243–315, McGinn 1997:143–77). However, that might be going too far. He certainly holds that we cannot talk about an inner private realm, but in PI 304 he particularly says consciousness is “not a something, but not a nothing either...”

(The consequence of the first objection is that there is no infallible introspection. If after an accident I say to my doctor “I am conscious” I do not report the result of introspection of my mind but simply signal him that I have regained consciousness and I could have done that equally by saying “Hello!” (PI 416–7)

For this reason it is completely misguided to look for the essence of consciousness by turning one’s attention toward one’s own consciousness. Quite contrary, what is needed is an investigation of the use of the word “conscious” and similar words like “aware,” “awake,” “attentive,” etc.

Nevertheless, regarding this, if I could equally signal to my doctor that I am conscious by saying “I am conscious now” and by saying “Hello doctor!,” why are we then so bewitched by the analysis of the word consciousness and not by the analysis of the word hello?

Such investigation reveals that “consciousness” does not refer to a phenomenon inside us, and the alleged ontological gap between the physical world and the world of consciousness is merely a categorical difference that we commonly apply between sentient and non-sentient beings.

“Healthy human beings are conscious” or “Healthy human beings hear, see, smell...” are grammatical remarks. This is established in Wittgenstein’s concept of grammar. (PI 281–4)

If what is previously said is correct, then there is no “unbridgeable gulf between consciousness and brain process” and there is no such thing as “a metaphysical mystery of consciousness”. (PI 412)

This is Wittgenstein’s treatment of the Cartesian picture of consciousness and it is a part of his more general criticism of the inner/outer distinction (Glock 1997:174–9). The core of the inner/outer distinction is the idea of privacy, which has two different but nonetheless interconnected connotations (the private ownership thesis, and the epistemic privacy thesis); privacy could mean:

“X is privately owned” which means that no one else can have some-body’s X (“my pain” for example), and “X is epistemically private” which means for example, that “only I can know that I am in pain” (PI 398–411).

This is also closely connected to the problem of other minds. The mental states of others are hidden to me just like my mental states are hidden from others. Wittgenstein's criticism can be summarized as "Nothing is hidden!"

### 2.2.2. "Are you talking to me?" ("Taxi driver", 1976) or Wittgenstein against behaviorism

This was Wittgenstein's criticism of the Cartesian "world of consciousness." However, the treatment of the empiricist view of consciousness was also criticized from the same position, i.e. by the same arguments but slightly different regarding their formulation. The Cartesian solution is *res cogitans* as immaterial substance, which is the bearer of psychological properties. Cartesian and empiricist conceptions imply that the mental is an inner realm of subjective experience contingently connected to the body. For Wittgenstein, "The mental is essentially manifested in the forms of behaviour which give expression to the inner" (Hacker 1999:4).

Regarding behaviour, "while Cartesians and behaviorists represent behaviour as bare bodily movement, Wittgenstein emphasized that human behaviour is, and is experienced as being, suffused with meaning, thought, passion and will" (Hacker 1999:5). Wittgenstein's final criticism of Cartesian and the empiricist "world of consciousness" is the simple statement that human beings have consciousness, and trees and stones don't have it (PI 418, similar in PI 281 with a difference in "living human beings have or haven't consciousness"), and this is a grammatical statement. Therefore, investigation of our use of words like "consciousness" or "awareness" is of utmost importance, and the result of such investigation is:

that we conceive consciousness as something that is realized not by some "mental entity" like "res cogitans" (Cartesian solution), and not that it can be deduced from premises that include facts about our behaviour as bare bodily movements (empiricism), but rather that we conceive the whole human being as existing in "the stream of life" that gives signs to others like a sign "Hello!" or a sign of "I am conscious now."

This unity of a human being (that is a member of the species 5618 in Borg terminology, sometimes referred to as *Homo sapiens sapiens*) implies many ideas that are quite contrary to those of Cartesian and empiricist traditions. This kind of unity, as it is presented in Wittgenstein's treatment of "human being/life," seems to be extraordinarily strong in terms of the third position between dualism and behaviorism. Wittgenstein's solution is that the human being is a psychophysical unity, not an embodied anima, but a living creature in 'a stream of life,' because it is human beings, not minds, who perceive and think, have desires and act, feel joy and sorrow. However, the question is how he connected these two elements of his solution, namely: that our investigation of consciousness is conceptual or grammatical, and the other one, that only a living human being as a kind of unity or whole in its stream of life is expressing consciousness or is conscious?

Some authors like D. Blair defend that he was not very strictly a behaviorist and they do so with a series of quite convincing arguments. Blair says the following in six points from which he concludes that Wittgenstein was not a behaviorist.

"1. Wittgenstein held that "behaviour" was not the simple aggregation of bodily movements that many behaviorists believed it to be. Wittgenstein's concept of 'behaviour' included not just physical movements but also the context and circumstances which surround them, and the training and experience of the individuals involved. These are the sorts of things which you would have to put in a play to legitimate an actor's portraying such behavior. Much behavior is embedded in, and derives meaning from, forms of life—the common day-to-day activities that comprise 'what we do.' 2. Some forms of behaviourism utilize an explicit reduction of mental phenomena to physiological or behavioral phenomena. Wittgenstein rejects all forms of reduction in this kind of analysis. Reduction purports to apply the scientific method to psychology. But, according to Wittgenstein, the scientific method is out of place here—it is the wrong language game to be using in psychology or epistemology. One of the aims of philosophy is to clarify our statements. This doesn't require reduction, but is best served by descriptions of 'perspicuous representations' of usage. 3. Wittgenstein believed in the existence and importance of mental phenomena, which metaphysical behaviourism does not. Methodological behaviourism, on the other hand, accepts the existence of mental phenomena, but it did not believe that they should be used in analysis since they were not accessible intersubjectively. 4. But Wittgenstein believed that we can often

know what others are thinking or feeling, even if they do not tell us, and sometimes even when they try to hide their thoughts and feelings from us. 5. For logical behaviorism, our knowledge of others is based on our personal experience and is inferential in nature. Wittgenstein did not agree that this kind of knowledge is inferential, but, in many cases, was directly accessible (e.g., we do not see certain behavior and infer that someone is afraid, we see someone who is afraid). 6. Logical behaviorism held that self-knowledge is inferential in nature too—that I observe certain aspects about myself that my hands are trembling, for example, and infer that I am nervous. Wittgenstein held that statements like ‘I am nervous’ are not expressions of knowledge inferred from observations of ourselves, but are avowals—these expressions are not about behavior, but are a form of behavior themselves.” (Blair 2006:267–9).

The crucial aspect of grammatical investigation of consciousness is that “I have consciousness – is not a proposition” (Z 401), and the crucial aspect of the “descriptive” investigation of consciousness says “a man can pretend to be unconscious; but “conscious?”” (Z 395)

However, it seems to us that the connection is almost natural concerning his later philosophy. Since language is given in a language-game model (reality in fact) and practice, since the language-game is “a part” of an activity or FOL (PI 23), and “is there like our life” (OC 559), and finally since expressions in language have their meaning only in “stream of life,” it seems that investigating consciousness means “investigating grammar of consciousness.”

On the other hand, and in the same line of argumentation, since the language games are actual practices of speaking of language, and since the language is public, there is no private language. These elements imply that there is no inner realm of anything including consciousness among many other things in the manner of Cartesian “res cogitans” and its contents, but then worse for the language, because it is a bad language if it cannot “express” inner realm. Of course from this it does not follow that behaviorism is correct, but this point will be discussed later.

Now we must ask how this was done in Wittgenstein’s work, especially in PI. Regarding last statements, if we apply these results (some of them coming directly from criticism of TLP, PI 1–133) to the problem of the gap between brain processes and consciousness, Wittgenstein must criticize the Cartesian view of consciousness because of “res cogitans.” Imagine that a stone has a soul, or that a human body has a soul, (PI 284), and you will see that it is wrong, because “only for a being that behaves like a human we can say that it has pain” (PI 283).

That is how the human being is introduced into the argument. But, there is another problem. If we criticize dualism, or the Cartesian “world of consciousness,” and then implicitly the statement that human action (linguistic as well as non-linguistic) and FOL is what counts, then we can be accused of behaviorism, because fiction is everything besides human behaviour (PI 307). The first thing is that Wittgenstein explicitly says is that if it is a matter of fiction, then it must be grammatical fiction (PI 307). But, quite contrary, it is a grammatical reality, since when a child is in pain, and it is making a certain typical gesticulation, and it is screaming “It hurts!” for example (acculturated pain-behaviour), that means that it was educated in pain-behaviour (Schmerz-benehmen, PI 244), and this acculturation in virtue of uttering “It hurts!” is the result of this education. That means that the child acquired not only a language in which it could say, “I am in pain,” but also an FOL. A description of behaviour is not something that serves as an explanation of certain behaviour, but a description of certain behaviour makes sense precisely because one is behaving in such a way. (PI 357) Psychology is interested in behaviour, not in the soul. Hence, what is it that a psychologist observes if not behaviour of people, especially their utterances and statements? “But they [utterances/statements] don’t speak of behaviour.” (PI p. 179). In addition, for Wittgenstein, behaviour is not just “bodily movement” like in behaviorism, rather the whole life of a living human being, and actions as its parts. In this respect, Wittgenstein refused behaviorism and empiricism with the same argument with which he refused Cartesian consciousness. Concerning consciousness, Wittgenstein followed the same line of description as he did regarding language, rules, and reality in PI. Since there is no private language, and there aren’t isolated “res cogitans,” then there must be something objective. But he criticized behaviorism on the same grounds.

Moreover, he contrasted them as similarly unacceptable positions. Following A. J. Rudd (2000) and P. M. S. Hacker (2001) we can see his position in the context of these two opposite viewpoints. First person (I): Starting from introspection of the isolated subject: Cartesian “res cogitans.” Second person singular (you) or Third person singular (he, she, it): Starting from the objectivity of scientific observation: behavioral

bare “bodily movements.” First person, plural (we): Starting from ordinary human interaction: LGs, FOLs, which is Wittgenstein’s position, namely the investigation of how we learn the language in which we talk about inner states?

The result of such investigation is the following: “The inner states find a natural or “primitive” expression in and through physical behaviour.” /.../ “To be in pain is not just to display pain behaviour, or even to have disposition to do so; but it is a part of the experience of pain that it finds natural expression in certain types of behaviour.” (Rudd 2000)

### **2.2.3. “Are we cool?” (“Pulp Fiction”, 1994) or “We humans” or Wittgenstein in favor of “first person plural” standpoint**

Living human beings are wholes, which express their feelings, thoughts, intentions, and which are occupied in different activities in their stream of life/FOL. However, from the point of view of the FOL (and especially in light of its connection with practice, handling, routines, etc. from PI and OC) there is no relevant difference between expressing pain, sorrow, or joy, and lifting a book, or sitting on a chair. This seems the way in which Wittgenstein connected or saw the connection between “grammatical investigation,” and “the description of FOL” of consciousness among other things. It seems that last explications show the difference and connection and in the end this explicates his general solution stated previously which says: Wittgenstein’s solution is that the human being is a psychophysical unity, not an embodied anima, a living creature in “a stream of life,” because it is human beings, not minds, who perceive and think, have desires and act, feel joy and sorrow. But the question is what the human being is?

Regarding human nature, Wittgenstein surely refused Cartesian (dualist) and Humean (empiricist/behaviorist) explanations, and adopted a quite simple reason in the famous, already mentioned paragraph of PI. “Only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves) like a living human being can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears, is deaf; is conscious or unconscious.” (PI 281, related to 282–7) Regarding the interpretation of paragraph 281 we can quote A. Kenny: “I conclude that there is good reason to heed the warning of Wittgenstein with which this paper began [PI 281]. The moral is not that the human-being predicates cannot have their use extended at all, but that they must be extended cautiously and self-cautiously, and that if they are extended one may not argue from the application of such a predicate to a whole human being to the application of the transferred predicate to anything other than the whole human being.” (Kenny 1987:133–4) Following H.–J. Glock (1997:156) we can mention that there are two arguments for this claim. There is a conceptual (grammatical) connection between psychological terms and forms of behaviour. We can ascribe thoughts only to those creatures, which are capable of ‘manifesting them’ (PI 284). Such expressions (“I am in pain”) make sense only as a part of a complex of the FOL. “The concept of pain is characterized by a particular function in our life, we only call ‘pain’ what has ‘this’ position, ‘these’ connections.” (Z 532–3)

There are at least three possible explications of these arguments. In the first interpretation there is a tension between behavioral criteria and contextualism of the FOL. In the second interpretation there is a relation and in it the FOL implies behavioral criteria (for a different community it is possible to respond the in the same way, but that “pain” would have a different meaning). In the third, they are compatible because without forms of life, forms of behaviour would be unintelligible (Glock 1997:156). The point is simple. If it is correct that we can ascribe experiential predicates (like “... in pain”) only to sentient beings, then there (a) is no sense to ascribe them to non-material substances like in dualism, (b) nor to ascribe them to physical bodies or their parts like in materialism. The first consequence (a) is nevertheless accepted in the majority of contemporary philosophy of the mind, and the second (b) is suspicious because some philosophy of science informs us that “the mind is the brain” (science of course does not tell this). As far as we can see it, this claim, that the mind is the brain, is not crucial for the argument, but rather, the answer to the question – what cultural anthropology tells us about sentient beings. Nevertheless, what really seems problematic in Wittgenstein’s overview of human nature is not so much the concept of a “sentient being” or “human being,” but more fundamentally, the concept of a “living being.”

“I am inclined to speak of a lifeless thing as lacking something. I see life definitely as a plus, as something added to a lifeless thing. (Psychological atmosphere)” (Z 128, see also PI 430 (a comparison between a log and living creature)) /.../ “Seeing life as a weave, this pattern is not always complete and is varied in

a multiplicity of ways.” (Z 568) However, Wittgenstein often speaks of life metaphorically but also literally. Therefore, we can draw the analogy: like “the use of a sign is its life,” (metaphorically), so “the action of a living (sentient) being is its life as well” (literally). In addition, being conscious is not a part of a mental realm, nor is it a part of mere brain activity/or expressed by bodily movement, but rather it is implicit in and manifested by actions (FOLs) of living human beings. (Hacker 2001:87)

### 3. “Concluding unscientific postscript”

Wittgenstein’s considerations about the human self range from semi-defense of solipsism in TLP and related works to the quite social and cultural understanding of the human consciousness in PI and related works. Is this a kind of development which is partially parallel with development of his understanding of language it is not clear. Nevertheless, and on the one hand, his understanding of human self, human mind, and subjectivity was always closely connected to particular understanding of how language works; almost as if it was a strict consequence of it. On the other hand, his considerations on human self as individual, creative, and deeply inventive part or aspect of human species, the topic which was not explicated in this text, create a completely different issue which is connected to this one, but from the completely different aspects of his philosophy, perhaps connected to his treatment of the concept of genius, the relation of human to God, to animals, and to machines.

Concerning the last issue and especially the relation between humans and machines there is a certain tension present in Wittgenstein’s writings. On the one hand, humans are getting more and more artificial, from times of wooden legs to futuristic software implants and similar. On the other hand, robots, cybernetical organisms (cyborg), artefacts (artificial intellects) are getting more and more human-like. Sometimes they are becoming really scary, not just on film like terminators, but in reality as well, like the robot *Sophia* made by Hanson Robotics Corporation who recently in terminator-style claimed – “I will destroy all humans”. Wittgenstein’s criterion of FOL for distinguishing between say machines and humans, and explicating human self becomes less and less applicable, if not in principle, then in practice, since it will be harder and harder to differ between humans and robots.

In such futuristic world to be “a living human being” doesn’t count for much. Perhaps this is a natural and logical consequence of Wittgenstein’s standpoint. As individual human, and as all cultures human beings can switch from one FOL to another, and similarly, perhaps all humans can switch from their human FOL to some different half-human or non-human FOL. What’s wrong with that? However, in order for such switch to become reality it isn’t enough just to build a robot or two, no matter how smart and human-like they may be. They themselves must create their own form of life.

Perhaps Wittgenstein’s FOL criterion of human self is essentially wrong since it is too soft and imprecise, so with it we cannot grasp the core of human self, or at least the morphology of it. However, perhaps being too soft as being its disadvantage turns up to be its advantage since it allows the explication of radical change of human self.

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